




































© 2011 Marc Henry, Ismael Mourifié. Tous droits réservés. All rights reserved. Reproduction partielle permise 
avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©. 







  2011s-49 
 
Euclidean Revealed Preferences: Testing the 
Spatial Voting Model 
 
Marc Henry, Ismael Mourifié CIRANO 
Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le financement de 
son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-membres, d’une subvention 
d’infrastructure du Ministère du Développement économique et régional et de la Recherche, de même que des subventions et 
mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. 
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and research 
activities  are  funded  through  fees  paid  by  member  organizations,  an  infrastructure  grant  from  the  Ministère  du 
Développement économique et régional et de la Recherche, and grants and research mandates obtained by its research 
teams. 
 
Les partenaires du CIRANO 
Partenaire majeur 
Ministère du Développement économique, 
de l’Innovation et de l’Exportation 
Partenaires corporatifs 
Autorité des marchés financiers 
Banque de développement du Canada 
Banque du Canada 
Banque Laurentienne du Canada 
Banque Nationale du Canada 
Banque Royale du Canada 
Banque Scotia 
Bell Canada 
BMO Groupe financier 
Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec 
CSST 
Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec 





Ministère des Finances du Québec 
Power Corporation du Canada 
Rio Tinto Alcan 
State Street Global Advisors 
Transat A.T. 
Ville de Montréal 
Partenaires universitaires 




Université de Montréal 
Université de Sherbrooke 
Université du Québec 
Université du Québec à Montréal 
Université Laval 
 




Les cahiers de la série scientifique (CS) visent à rendre accessibles des résultats de recherche effectuée au CIRANO afin 
de susciter échanges et commentaires. Ces cahiers sont écrits dans le style des publications scientifiques. Les idées et les 
opinions émises sont sous l’unique responsabilité des auteurs et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions du 
CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. 
This paper presents research carried out at CIRANO and aims at encouraging discussion and comment. The observations 
and  viewpoints  expressed  are  the  sole  responsibility  of  the  authors.  They  do  not  necessarily  represent  positions  of 
CIRANO or its partners. 
Partenaire financier Euclidean Revealed Preferences:  














In the spatial model of voting, voters choose the candidate closest to them in the ideological 
space. Recent work by (Degan and Merlo 2009) shows that it is falsifiable on the basis of 
individual voting data in multiple elections. We show how to tackle the fact that the model 
only  partially  identifies  the  distribution  of  voting  profiles  and  we  give  a  formal  revealed 
preference test of the spatial voting model in 3 national elections in the US, and strongly reject 
the spatial model in all cases. We also construct confidence regions for partially identified 
voter characteristics in an augmented model with unobserved valence dimension, and identify 
the amount of voter heterogeneity necessary to reconcile the data with spatial preferences. 
 
Keywords:  revealed  preference,  partial  identification,  elliptic  preferences, 
voting behaviour. 
 
Codes JEL: C19, D72 
                                                 
* Date: The present version is of May 17, 2011. Financial support from SSHRC Grant 410-2010-242 is gratefully 
acknowledged. The authors are also grateful to the co-editor Thierry Magnac, three anonymous referees, Russell 
Davidson, Romuald Méango, Aureo de Paula, Yves Sprumont, Bernard Salanié, Étienne de Villemeur and 
participants at the Montreal Conference on Revealed Preferences and Partial Identification and the Penn State 
econometrics seminar for helpful discussions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
† Département de sciences économiques, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville, Montréal 
QC, H3C 3J7, Canada. Tel: 1 (514) 343-2404. Fax: 1 (514) 343-7221. Email: marc.henry@umontreal.ca  
‡ Université de Montréal. 2 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
Introduction
The analysis of voting decisions is an integral part of the revealed preference theory of non-market
interactions. A dominant framework in the analysis of voting data is the spatial theory of voting
of (Hotelling 1929) and (Downs 1957), which characterizes voters and candidates in an election by
their positions in a common ideological space and postulates that voters choose candidates closest
to them in that space (see (Hinich and Munger 1997) and (Poole 2005) for accounts of the theory).
Two fundamental questions arise regarding the empirical content of this theory.
(1) Are the distribution of voter ideological positions (hence voter preferences) identi¯ed on the
basis of voting choices?
(2) Can the fundamental behavioral assumption of the spatial theory be rejected on the basis
of voting data?
Following the work of (Heckman and Snyder 1997) and (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), data on the
position of candidates in a two-dimensional ideological space are now widely available (see also
(Poole 2005) and references therein). Hence the ¯rst question can be reformulated in the following
way: does the maintained assumption of spatial voting allow the identi¯cation of voter positions
in the ideological space on the basis of the knowledge of candidate positions and aggregate voting
outcomes? This question is answered a±rmatively by (Merlo and de Paula 2009) who also provide a
nonparametric estimation strategy with data on repeated elections. The second question is tackled in
di®erent guises by (Bogomolnaia and Laslier 2007), (Degan and Merlo 2009) and (Kalandrakis 2010).
(Bogomolnaia and Laslier 2007) ¯nd the minimal dimension for the ideological space such that voter
preference orderings over a ¯nite number of candidates can be represented by spatial utility functions.
(Kalandrakis 2010) derives testable restrictions on the positions of voters' ideal points based on a
¯nite number of binary voting choices, when the positions of the alternatives are known. (Degan andEUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 3
Merlo 2009) establish conditions for the falsi¯ability of the spatial model in the context of multiple
elections, individual voting pro¯le data and observable candidate positions. Falsi¯ability then derives
from the multiplicity of elections; in a single election, a vote for candidate j is compatible with the
voter's ideal point lying in the Voronoi cell of candidate j's position (i.e. all points in the space for
whom j is closest among all alternatives). With multiple elections, a voting pro¯le is compatible
with the voter belonging to the intersection of the Voronoi cells of respective candidates chosen
in that voting pro¯le. When the number of elections is strictly larger than the dimension of the
ideological space, some such intersections are empty and the spatial model is falsi¯able.
Based on this result, we ¯rst provide an econometric methodology to formally test the hypothesis
of spatial voting based on observed individual voting pro¯les from multiple elections, where the
ideological position of candidates are known. The main di±culty in setting up a test of the spatial
voting model is that the model does not pin down the data generating process for the voting pro¯les.
This is in sharp contrast with the literature on compatibility of discrete choice probabilities and
stochastic utility maximization. (Daly and Zachary 1979) and (McFadden 1979) give necessary and
su±cient conditions for a discrete choice distribution to be compatible with the maximization of an
additively separable random utility. See also (Borsch-Supan 1990) and (Koning and Ridder 2003).
The compatibility conditions rely crucially on the coherency of the model, in the sense of (Heckman
1978) and (Gouri¶ eroux, La®ont, and Monfort 1980), and identi¯ability of its components.
We show that in the present context, despite lack of identi¯cation, the null hypothesis of com-
patibility between the voting data and the spatial model can still be formally tested with an appeal
to partial identi¯cation techniques recently developed in (Galichon and Henry 2011). This par-
tial identi¯cation approach to revealed preference testing relates our work directly to (Blundell,
Browning, and Crawford 2008), (Hoderlein and Stoye 2009) and, even more closely (Kawai and
Watanabe 2010). The latter partially identify preference parameters in a voting model in which a4 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
fraction of voters incorporate strategic considerations in their voting decisions. A partially identi¯ed
setting also arises in (Hoderlein and Stoye 2009) who provide a test of WARP based on consumption
data from repeated cross sections of heterogeneous consumers. Finally, (Blundell, Browning, and
Crawford 2008) also provide empirical implications of revealed preference axioms in the forms of
bounds on demand responses.
We test spatial voting in US National elections for years 2000, 2004, and 2008 and the whole data
combined. In all three elections, we reject the hypothesis that voters have elliptic preferences over
candidates. That is to say, we reject the spatial voting model with heterogeneity of unknown form,
both in voter bliss points and in the distances characterizing preferences. This brings new striking
evidence to bear on the debate over the adequacy of the spatial voting model in explaining stylized
facts on the positioning of political party platforms, and the convergence to the center implied by
median voter results (see (Zakharov 2008) for an excellent account). Former empirical analysis and
tests of the spatial voting model were conducted assuming knowledge of voter ideological positions
(see (Alvarez and Nagler 1998), (Jeong 2008) and references therein). The latter is a reasonable
assumption, when analyzing roll call voting in the House and the Senate, but much less so, when
analyzing voter behavior in general elections.
Another substantial distinction with roll call voting is the coexistence and competition of two
voting logics in general elections, ideology versus performance. The spatial model describes voters'
preferences over the candidate's program, whereas preferences over the candidate herself, involving
charisma, experience and competence, are typically captured with an additive non spatial term in
the utility, generally called valence. A fundamental di®erence between the valence dimensions and
the dimensions of the ideological space is that preferences are satiated relative to the latter only.
The spatial model is augmented with a valence dimension in (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000) andEUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 5
(Groseclose 2001). (Azrieli 2009) axiomatizes the model and (Scho¯eld 2007) shows that incorpo-
rating the valence dimension leads to equilibria, where party platforms do not all converge to the
center of the electoral distribution.
As in the problem of testing the validity of the spatial model, the problem of estimating and
testing valence speci¯cations of the spatial model is complicated by the fact that voter's ideal points
are unobserved and the model only partially identi¯es the distribution of voting pro¯les. We show
how to construct con¯dence regions for the partial e®ect of distance to ideal point and of valence
characteristics in the utility speci¯cation. Of particular empirical relevance are the spatial preference
parameter con¯gurations compatible with the smallest values of valence dispersion. These can be
interpreted as estimates of the spatial preference parameters that best rationalize the data. A notable
¯nding is that voter di®er from candidates in their perception of the relevant ideological dimensions
and that the liberal-conservative axis of the standard ideological space dominates the social issues
axis in voter preferences. This opens the possibility for parties to gain vote shares by rebalancing
political platforms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the Section 1 we characterize the empirical
content of the spatial model of voting. In Section 2, we introduce valence. The data is described in
Section 3 and the empirical results in Section 4. The last section concludes.
1. Empirical content of the spatial voting model
1.1. Analytical framework. The spatial model of voting postulates a common ideological space
Y µ Rk, where k is the number of ideological dimensions. Voters face m > k simultaneous elec-
tions, each indexed by e 2 f1;:::;mg. In election e, each voter chooses exactly one candidate
je 2 Je = f1;:::;qeg among the qe candidates competing in election e. All candidates j 2 [m
e=1Je6 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
are characterized by their position yj in the ideological space, which is observed by the voters and
the analyst. In the rest of this work, we shall consider only two-candidate elections, hence qe = 2.
Because of its elegance, simplicity and interpretability, the spatial voting model has dominated
a large section of the literature on the analysis of voting choices. An excellent account can be
found in (Zakharov 2008). Following the principal component analysis of roll call voting in the US
Congress, the two-dimensional NOMINATE Common Space (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) has become
a staple of empirical work on the issue. Ideological positions of members of Congress are estimated
on the unit square of a two-dimensional space, the ¯rst axis of which is usually interpreted as the
liberal-conservative axis, measuring economic conservatism, and the second axis of which is usually
interpreted as measuring position on social issues. Given the prevalence of this two-dimensional
spatial voting model, we will concentrate on the case k = 2 in the rest of this work.
Voters are said to have Euclidean preference (or to \vote ideologically") if their preferences are
satiated at a bliss point yi for voter i in the ideological space and if they maximize a utility function,
which is decreasing in the Euclidean distance between their bliss point and the position yj of the
chosen candidate.
De¯nition 1 (Euclidean preferences). Voter i 2 I has Euclidean preferences (\votes ideologically")
if there exists yi 2 Y such that voter i chooses to vote for candidate j in each election e, denoted
vi
e = j, if and only if yj minimizes distance d(yi;y;!) among yj
0
, j0 2 Je, where ! = (!1;!2)0,
!2
2 < !1 and





Figure 1 shows the elliptic indi®erence curves for a voter, whose ideological bliss point is yi and
whose utility when candidate with position yj is elected is a negative non increasing function of
d(yi;yj;!). The dotted circle represents an indi®erence curve for voter i when !1 = 1 and !2 = 0,EUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 7
i.e. when the space of reference for candidate coordinates is the e®ective ideological space for the
voter. Note that candidates yj and yl are both on the circle, and hence are indi®erent. The dotted
vertical ellipse represents the indi®erence curve for voter i when !2 = 0 and !1 < 1. In that case, the
main axes are still the e®ective ideological dimensions, but in the given units of measurements, the
horizontal axis is dominant in the sense that yl, closer to yi in the horizontal dimension, is preferred
to yj, closer to yi in the vertical dimension. When !2 6= 0, the ideological space is di®erent from
the reference space. yj is now preferred to yl.
1.2. Falsi¯ability of the model. Denoting vi = (vi
1;:::;vi
m) the voting pro¯le of voter i, i.e the
collection of candidates voter i chooses in elections e = 1;:::;m, the hypothesis that voters have
Euclidean preferences is falsi¯able if there exist at least one voting pro¯le e v, which cannot be
rationalized by the maximization of Euclidean preferences in each election.
Example 1. In ¯gure 2, we illustrate a case with two ideological dimensions and 2 simultaneous
elections with 2 candidates each. The black dots represent candidate positions, yj1 and yl1 in elec-
tion 1 and yj2 and yl2 in election 2. The lines He, e = 1;2 separate the ideological space into the
half-space, where voters vote for candidate je and the half-space, where voters vote for candidate le.
The intersection of the half-space, where voters vote for j1 in the ¯rst election, say and the half-
space, where voters vote for l2 in the second elections is denoted j1l2 in the ¯gure. All four possible
voting pro¯les are rationalizable by the maximization of Euclidean preferences, hence the hypothesis
is not falsi¯able.
Example 2. In ¯gure 3, we illustrate the case with 2 ideological dimensions and 3 simultaneous
elections, with = 2 candidates each. In addition to the half-spaces in example 1, H3 separates
the ideological space in two regions, one, where voters prefer (are closer to) candidate j3 and one,
where voters prefer (are closer to) candidate l3. The intersection of three half-spaces corresponds8 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
to a particular voting pro¯le. For any con¯guration of candidate positions such that yj 6= yl when
j 6= l, there is exactly one voting pro¯le which is incompatible with Euclidean preference, hence the
hypothesis is falsi¯able. In ¯gure 3, the half-spaces of voters, who vote for j1 in election 1, for
j2 in election 2 and for l3 in election 3 have empty intersection. Hence, voting pro¯le j1j2l3 is
incompatible with spatial voting.
More generally, (Degan and Merlo 2009) show that for two candidate elections, falsi¯ability is
equivalent to m > k. In a small data exploration on US National elections, where voters are faced
with m = 3 simultaneous elections (presidential, senate and house) and individual voting pro¯les
and candidate ideological positions in R2 are observed, (Degan and Merlo 2009) ¯nd evidence of
violations of ideological voting as de¯ned in De¯nition 1 with !1 = 1 and !2 = 0 constant across
voters. In the data set that we consider, with the US 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections, we report
incidence of violations of the spatial model with no heterogeneity in Table 4. In order to evaluate
the statistical signi¯cance of these violations and examine alternative speci¯cations, some form of
voter heterogeneity needs to be introduced in the utility speci¯cation. Unobserved heterogeneity may
be entertained within the spatial model in the form of voter speci¯c distance d(:;:;!) as we describe
in the next section. It may also take the form of a non spatial random utility term, when allowing
for voters' response to non ideological characteristics of the candidate. We defer the discussion of
the latter form of voter heterogeneity to Section 2 below.
1.3. Unobserved preference heterogeneity. Preference heterogeneity may be entertained within
the framework of the spatial voting model by assuming that voters may di®er in their perception
of the relevant ideological dimensions. That is to say, the distance d(:;:;!) in the spatial utility
function may be voter speci¯c. Thus the requirement that voters have Euclidean preferences ac-
cording to de¯nition 1 is equivalent to a requirement that all voters have outward decreasing elliptic
preferences in that each voter i with position yi chooses candidate to minimize d(yi;yj;!i), whereEUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 9
!i is voter speci¯c. To conduct a revealed preference test of this assumption of elliptic preference
maximization, we need to characterize the empirical content of the assumption as follows.
Let X denote the set of observable variables, which includes the positions of all candidates in
the elections. A given voter with bliss point (position in the ideological space) y and preference
parameter ! characterizing the shape of her indi®erence curves is facing m = k + 1 = 3 elections
(recalling that k = 2 is the dimension of the ideological space) characterized by the vector X of
positions of all candidates. Given (y;!;X), the resulting voting pro¯le v is uniquely determined
by the voting model as long as assumptions on the distribution of candidates rule out ties. Denote
the unique implied voting pro¯le v = g(!jX;y), which is the pro¯le of choices of candidates je
such that yje minimizes d(y;yj
0
e;!) among candidates j0
e 2 fje;leg in each election e. For instance,
in example 2, g(!jX;y) = l1l2j3 when y belongs to the central triangle. However, the position y
of voters is unobservable, hence all that utility maximization predicts is that v lies within the set
of compatible voting pro¯les, which depends on the positions of candidates X and the realization
! of preference heterogeneity. For instance, in example 2, the model only tells us that v lies in
fj1j2j3;j1l2j3;j1l2l3;l1j2j3;l1j2l3;l1l2j3;l1l2l3g. We denote G(!jX) this set of compatible voting
pro¯les, i.e., G(!jX) =
S
y g(!jX;y). The model predicts the following bound on the probability of
voting pro¯le being V = v:
P(V = vjX) = P(g(!jX;y) = vjX) · P(v 2 G(!jX)jX);
since the only model prediction is g(!jX;y) 2 G(!jX) for any y in the ideological space. Similarly,
for any subset B of the set of all 2m possible voting pro¯les, the model predicts the following bound
on the probability of the voting pro¯le V belonging to B.
P(V 2 BjX) · P(G(!jX) \ B 6= ;jX): [EC]10 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
The inequalities above specify a set of bounds on the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
As shown above, if voters' choices are compatible with spatial preferences with heterogeneity, the
inequalities in [EC] are necessarily satis¯ed. Conversely, if the inequalities in [EC] are satis¯ed,
then voters' choices can be rationalized by spatial preferences with heterogeneity. In that precise
sense, the inequalities in [EC] de¯ne sharp bounds on the distribution of unobserved heterogene-
ity. The converse statement is a corollary of Theorem 1 in (Galichon and Henry 2011) (see also
(Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari 2011)). One way to gain insight into the proof of this re-
sult is to characterize rationalizability of voters' choices by spatial preferences as the existence of
an assignment of voting pro¯les v to unobserved heterogeneity values ! satisfying the constraints
v 2 G(!jX). By the Marriage Lemma, such an assignment exists if and only if there is no over
demanded set of !'s, which in the present setting means there is no subset B of voting pro¯les such
that P(BjX) > P(G(!jX) \ B 6= ;jX). The discussion above can be summarized in the following
theorem, which gives the characterization of the empirical content of the model.
Theorem 1 (Empirical content). The empirical content of the spatial voting model is characterized
by the inequalities [EC] for each subset B of the set of voting pro¯les.
Theorem 1 tells us that a test of the spatial voting model with heterogeneity in the shape of
the voters' indi®erence curves, i.e., in !, is equivalent to testing that the inequalities [EC] hold.
Letting the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity ! be characterized by the parameter vector
µ, we consider the set £I (possibly empty) of values of µ, such that [EC] hold, noting that the
right-hand side of [EC] depends on the distribution of !, hence on µ. £I is called the identi¯ed set.
De¯nition 2. (Identi¯ed set) We call identi¯ed set £I the set of parameter values such that the
moment inequalities in [EC] hold.EUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 11
By theorem 1, £I is exactly the set of parameters µ such that the spatial voting model with
heterogeneity is not rejected. £I is sometimes called sharp identi¯ed set to emphasize the fact that
all values of µ in £I are observationally equivalent: no value in £I can be rejected on the basis of
the information contained in the spatial model and the true distribution of voting pro¯les.
As a result, a test of the inequalities of Theorem 1 is a classical revealed preference test of
the spatial voting model. The way we implement the test is to construct a con¯dence region for
the identi¯ed set, using the methodology proposed in (Henry, M¶ eango, and Queyranne 2010) and
described in detail in Appendix A. In the data set described in Section 3, we ¯nd a 99% con¯dence
region for the identi¯ed set £I to be empty, hence we reject the spatial voting model speci¯cation
with distance heterogeneity at the 99% level of signi¯cance (see Section 4 for details). In other
words, the data cannot be rationalized by a model with heterogenous elliptic preferences.
2. Introducing valence
The rejection of the spatial model leads to the consideration of a non spatial component in
preferences. As mentioned in the introduction, there is a large literature in political science that
attempts to reconcile voting models with observed (non converging) distributions of political party
platforms by combining two logics of voting in voter preferences, the logic of ideology, in a spatial
term, and the logic of performance, in a non spatial non satiated valence term. We now adopt
this approach in our empirical investigation of the determinants of voting choices. The speci¯cation
generally considered in the literature is the following: voter i maximizes utility
Ui(j) = ¡d(yi;yj;!)2 + ²
j
i (2.1)








i ) is independently
distributed conditionally on X = (yj1;yl1;yj2;yl2;yj3;yl3). Let the distribution of the valence term
be parameterized with parameter µ.12 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
As in the case of heterogeneity in the distance characterizing preferences in Section 1, we denote by
G(²jX;!) the set of compatible pro¯les for a given realization ² of unobserved valence heterogeneity.
The same reasoning applies to show that the inequalities
P(V 2 BjX) · P(G(²jX;!) \ B 6= ;jX;µ) [ECval]
for each subset B of voting pro¯les, characterize the empirical content of the spatial model with
valence heterogeneity (note that now ² is the random unobserved heterogeneity, whereas ! is treated
as a deterministic parameter vector). The characterization of the empirical content of the model
in [ECval] still involves a large number of inequalities, namely up to one for each subset B of the
set V m of voting pro¯les. It turns out that in the case of valence heterogeneity, we can achieve a
dramatic dimension reduction to 2 inequalities. First we show the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Incompatible pro¯les). Let m = k +1 elections with 2 candidates in each election, then
for almost all X, there is a pair of pro¯les v(X) and v(X) such that for all ², Gc(²jX;!) = fv(X)g
or Gc(²jX;!) = fv(X)g.
In other words, for a given X characterizing the positions of all candidates, there is exactly
one voting pro¯le incompatible with Euclidean preferences and it belongs to a pair fv(X);v(X)g.
This pair is independent of ², so that for di®erent values of unobserved heterogeneity ², the unique
incompatible pro¯le can only take value v(X) or v(X). In example 2 and ¯gure 3, the two pro¯les
that are potentially incompatible with spatial voting are pro¯les l1l2j3 and j1j2l3. The formal proof
is given in the appendix, but it is very easy to understand its heuristics in ¯gure 3: j1j2l3 is the
only incompatible pro¯le and l1l2j3 is the only pro¯le with compact support, which is compatible
with spatial voting. The slopes of separating hyperplanes are independent of ². Hence non compact
pro¯le supports cannot disappear, and the only pro¯le that can disappear when ² shifts the location
of the lines in the ¯gure is l1l2j3. The latter disappears and is replaced by j1j2l3 in any of theEUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 13
following three cases: H1 moves su±ciently to the left, H2 moves su±ciently to the right or H3
moves su±ciently to the right. We are now in a position to show our simple characterization of the
empirical content of the model.
Theorem 2 (Empirical content of model with valence). The empirical content of the spatial voting
model is characterized by exactly 2 inequalities
P(v(X)jX) · P(v(X) 2 G(²jX;!)jX;µ) and P(v(X)jX) · P(v(X) 2 G(²jX;!)jX;µ): (2.2)
In other words, if the two inequalities are satis¯ed, then all inequalities in [ECval] are satis¯ed and
the spatial model with valence heterogeneity is compatible with the true voting pro¯le distribution.
Conversely, if for some X, one of these two inequalities is violated, then the true voting distribution
is incompatible with the spatial voting model with valence heterogeneity.
We are interested in the set ¥I of parameter values » = (!;µ) of the model (possibly empty)
such that (2.2) holds. This set is the identi¯ed set in the model with valence heterogeneity. Our
goal is to build a con¯dence region of asymptotic level cl for the identi¯ed set which is de¯ned as a
region ^ ¥ satisfying P(¥I µ ^ ¥) > cl asymptotically. The methodology derived from (Henry, M¶ eango,
and Queyranne 2010) is detailed in appendix A, where a step-by-step account of the procedure is
given. The procedure involves few, relatively simple steps and is computationally e±cient. Once the
con¯dence region ^ ¥ is obtained, we can directly test speci¯cations of the spatial model at the same
level of signi¯cance. Recall that ^ ¥ is a set of values of the parameter vector » that are not rejected.
Suppose for illustration purposes, that ² is normal with mean zero and variance ¾2. Suppose,
moreover that the region ^ ¥ does not contain any value of » with ¾ < 2, then ¾2 = 2 is a lower
bound on the variance of unobserved valence necessary to rationalize the data with model (2.1).
Suppose further that the region ^ ¥ does not contain any value of » with (!1;!2) = (1;0), then the14 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
spatial model with no distance distortion is rejected. If in ^ ¥ we always have !2 > 0 and !1 > 1, we
can reject the hypothesis that the NOMINATE Common Space ¯rst coordinate (liberal-conservative
axis) matters more to voters than the second coordinate (social issues).
The partial identi¯cation approach adopted here is particularly well suited to the revealed pref-
erence problem at hand. Indeed, we wish to test to what extent the spatial model rationalizes the
data. We have no information about the position of voters in the ideological space, hence it is
undesirable to predicate rejection of the spatial model on ad-hoc assumptions on the latter. This
would be the case, if we parameterized the distribution of voter positions and valence heterogeneity,
imposed additional restrictions for identi¯cation of this nonlinear model, estimated with maximum
likelihood and tested for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity with a version of (Chesher 1984).1
3. Data
Data are drawn from the following sources. The candidate positions are drawn from the Poole
and Rosenthal NOMINATE Common Space data set2 ((Poole and Rosenthal 1997), (Poole 2005)),
which gives the position of candidates on a two dimensional ideological space based on individual
roll call voting of members of Congress. Only candidates who have held o±ce are included in the
data set. A fundamental assumption here is that voters observe the true ideological position of
all candidates, whereas the econometrician only observes positions of candidates included in the
NOMINATE Common Space data set. Each candidate that has not held o±ce is assigned the
position among all candidates in his party and district, which is most favorable to the hypothesis
of spatial voting, to ensure that rejection of the model is not driven by missing data issues. This
1We are grateful to the co-editor Thierry Magnac for this suggestion.
2Available at http://voteview.comEUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 15
is done by choosing the position, which minimizes the number of voters in the district, who choose
one of the pair of forbidden pro¯les fv(X);v(X)g.
As for voting choices, they are obtained from the American National Elections Study (ANES),
which represents the best and most widely used source of individual-level data on electoral par-
ticipation and voting in United States3. For each election year, ANES contains individual voting
decisions in presidential and congressional elections of a nationally representative sample of the vot-
ing age population. In addition, the ANES contains information on the congressional district where
each individual resides, the identity of the Democratic and the Republican candidate competing for
election in his or her congressional district, and, in the event that a Senate election is also occurring
in his or her state, the identity of the candidates competing in the Senate race. For each election
we consider a sub-sample, which contains only voters, who vote in the three simultaneous elections.
Hence in any district h = 1;:::;435 in state s = 1;:::;50, a voter i is facing three simultaneous elec-
tions. As in (Degan and Merlo 2009), we match each voter in the ANES sample with the position
of the presidential, senate and house candidates. We consider election years 2000, 2004 and 2008.
3.1. Candidate positions. Summary statistics on the distribution of candidate positions on the
NOMINATE Common Space are described in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows that democratic
candidates are somewhat more dispersed than republican candidates in election year 2000, whereas
republican candidates are somewhat more dispersed in election years 2004 and 2008. The overall
dispersion is about twice as large as within party dispersion, but signi¯cantly smaller than between
party dispersion, as shown in the top half of Table 3. The 0 in the latter table indicates that in
election year 2000, one of the republican candidates shared their ideological position with one of
the democratic candidates, indicating that they may have had an identical roll call voting record.
The bottom half of Table 3 shows that the dispersion of elected candidates is greater than within
3The ANES is available on-line at http://www.electionstudies.org/16 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
party dispersion, but smaller than the overall dispersion of candidates. On the ¯rst axis, sometimes
called liberal-conservative axis, democratic and republican candidates are clearly separated, in the
sense that for every election year as well as for the aggregate data, mean § two standard deviations
con¯dence intervals for democratic and republican candidates are disjoint. This feature is also very
visible on the scatter plots of ¯gure 4. On the second axis (also referred to as the social issues axis),
however, the distributions of democratic and republic candidates are not clearly distinguishable.
3.2. Voting pro¯les. The distributions of voting pro¯les for elections years 2000 to 2008 are given
in Table 1. A large majority of voters choose candidates from the same party in all three elections
(75% in 2000, 76% in 2004 and 78% in 2008). Otherwise, no clear pattern arises among the remaining
voting pro¯les.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Distance heterogeneity. We considered a normal speci¯cation for !2 with mean ¹2 and
variance ¾2
2 and a log-normal speci¯cation for !1 with mean ¹1 and variance ¾2
1. !1 and !2 were
assumed independent. We restricted the parameter space to (¹1;¹2) 2 [¡5;5]£[0;10] and (¾2
1;¾2
2) 2
[0;13]2. The 99% level con¯dence region for the parameter vector (¹1;¹2;¾2
1;¾2
2) is empty, so that
the spatial voting model with distance heterogeneity is rejected at the 99% level of signi¯cance. We
conclude that voters' choices cannot be rationalized by spatial voting, even if we let the shape of
the indi®erence ellipses be voter speci¯c.
4.2. Valence heterogeneity. We considered two parametric speci¯cation for the valence term ² in
speci¯cation 2.1. We ¯rst modeled E = (²j1;²l1;²j2;²l2;²j3;²l3) as a vector of independent mean zero
binary variables taking values ´ and ¡´. Some features of the resulting con¯dence regions are given
in ¯gure 5 for the aggregate data, and results from individual elections are available on request. We
then considered the speci¯cation, where E is a vector of independent normal variables with meanEUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 17
zero and variance ¾2. Some features of the resulting con¯dence regions are given in ¯gure 6 for the
aggregate data. Figure 5(c) shows the 3-dimensional con¯dence region for the parameters of the
spatial model 2.1 (!;´). It is a 95% con¯dence region for the set of values of the parameter vector
under which the spatial model is valid. Figures 5(a) and (b) show the e®ect of an increase in the
admissible valence dispersion on the set of rationalizable distance distortions !. The pure Euclidean
model with !2 = 0 and !1 = 1 (such that indi®erence curves are circles) lies outside the cut in
con¯dence region in ¯gure 5(a), so it is not rationalizable, but it lies inside the cut in ¯gure 5(b), so
it becomes rationalizable for this higher level of admissible valence dispersion. The minimum value
of ´ in the region is 0:128. This indicates that the spatial model can only be rationalized by adding
a non ideological term in the utility of magnitude at least 0:128. This is to be compared with the
distribution of squared distances between candidates in Table 2. The minimum valence needed to
rationalize the valence-augmented spatial model is of the order of the mean of squared distances
between democratic candidates, half the mean of squared distances between all candidates and a
quarter of the mean of squared distances between democratic and republican candidates. Moreover,
for that minimal non spatial utility term, the model can only be rationalized for a speci¯c distance
distortion, namely ! = (!1;!2) = (0:333;¡0:111). This corresponds to a much greater emphasis on
the liberal-conservative axis than on the social axis. This can be seen more clearly on ¯gure 5(d)
which shows the tilt of the major axis of the elliptic indi®erence curves of voters compatible with the
minimum valence magnitude. The value is close to 100 degrees, which indicates a situation similar to
the dotted vertical ellipse of ¯gure 1. The NOMINATE Common Space is shared by voters, except
that greater importance is given to changes on the liberal-conservative axis. We see on ¯gure 5(d)
that the tilt of the indi®erence ellipses remains between 45 and 135 degrees for any value of the non
ideological disturbance ´ below 0:222. So the conclusion on the relative weights of each axis remains.18 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
In case of normal speci¯cation of the valence term, the 95% con¯dence region for the set of
parameters (!;¾) for which the valence-augmented spatial model is rationalizable is plotted in
¯gure 6(c). The minimal standard deviation needed to rationalize the valence-augmented spatial
model is 0:133. The corresponding indi®erence curves are ellipses with major axis titled at 100
degrees again, so that similar conclusions apply. The liberal-conservative axis remains dominant for
all values of the valence standard deviation below 0:178. Again, ¯gures 6(a) and (b) show the e®ect
of an increase in the admissible valence dispersion on the set of rationalizable distance distortions
!. The pure Euclidean model with !2 = 0 and !1 = 1 (such that indi®erence curves are circles) lies
outside the cut in con¯dence region in ¯gure 6(a), so it is not rationalizable, but it lies inside the
cut in ¯gure 6(b), so it becomes rationalizable for this higher level of admissible valence dispersion.
As seen on Table 5, those conclusions remain for data on individual elections, with however a clear
trend towards the spatial model, as the lowest valence term necessary to rationalize the data drops
from 0:119 in the 2000 elections, to 0:089 in the 2004 election and ¯nally 0:059 in the 2008 elections.
Overall results strongly support the hypothesis that voters' choices are driven by a combination
of ideological and competence considerations, as the magnitude of valence dispersion needed to
rationalize voter choices is very close to the mean of the distribution of squared ideological distances
between candidates from the same party and a ¯fth of the mean of squared ideological distances
between candidates of opposing parties. Results also strongly support the hypothesis that voters
give more weight to the liberal-conservative axis in the NOMINATE Common Space. The estimated
distance distortion gives candidates a direction in which to rebalance their political program in order
to increase their vote share. However, results do not support the hypothesis that the social issues axis
is irrelevant in voters' decisions. Indeed, the minimum valence dispersion needed to rationalize voters'
choices with a single ideological dimension (liberal-conservative axis alone, namely !1 = !2 = 0) isEUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 19
50% larger than the dispersion needed to rationalize voters' choices with two ideological dimensions
(see Table 5).
Conclusion
We have considered the spatial model of voting and provided a methodology for conducting
revealed preference tests of spatial preferences. Falsi¯ability of the model is driven by the existence
of voting pro¯les in multiple elections that are incompatible with maximization of spatial preferences
in each election. The main di±culty in testing the hypothesis of spatial voting is that the latter only
speci¯es a set of voting pro¯les compatible with spatial voting, and hence only partially identi¯es the
distribution of voting pro¯les. It is shown here how to circumvent this fundamental characteristic
of revealed preference tests with an appeal to recent results in partial identi¯cation. The hypothesis
of spatial preferences is strongly rejected in a sample of voting pro¯les from three US elections,
and con¯dence regions are constructed for the set of parameters compatible with the spatial voting
model augmented with an unobserved non spatial component. A robust ¯nding from those con¯dence
regions is that the ideological dimension generally associated with economic conservatism dominates
the dimension associated with social issues. The methodology is currently being extended to the
estimation of revealed spatial preferences over competing characteristics in social networks with
homophily, to complement work in (Christakis, Fowler, Imbens, and Kalyanaraman 2010), (Galichon
and Salani¶ e 2010) and (Chiappori, Gandhi, Salani¶ e, and Salani¶ e 2009).
Appendix A. Inference methodology
The methodology is detailed for inference on the identi¯ed set ¥I in case of valence heterogeneity.
It also applies to inference on the identi¯ed set £I in case of distance heterogeneity with a trivial20 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
change of notation, £I for ¥I and ! for ², and replacing the two inequalities of Theorem 2 by the
inequalities in [EC].
We are interested in constructing a random region ^ ¥ such that the true identi¯ed set ¥I is
contained in ^ ¥ with at least probability cl. Given the sample of observations ((V1;X1);:::;(Vn;Xn))
for a sample of n voters, we construct data dependent functions P(:jx) such that the following
statement is true with probability tending to no less than cl: P(~ vjXi) · P(~ vjXi) for all Xi,
and ~ v 2 f¹ v(Xi);v(Xi)g. Once this is achieved, the region ^ ¥ = f» = (!;µ) j P(~ vjXi) · P(~ v 2
G(²jXi;!)jXi;µ); i = 1;:::;n; ~ v(X) 2 f¹ v(X);v(X)gg satis¯es the required conditions: indeed,
if » 2 ¥I, » satis¯es (2.2), so with probability no less than cl, it also satis¯es P(~ vjXi) · P(~ v 2
G(²jXi;!)jXi;µ); i = 1;:::;n; ~ v(X) 2 f¹ v(X);v(X)g, hence it belongs to ^ ¥. The con¯dence region
is computed by checking every parameter value » = (!1;!2;µ) on a regular grid of 106 points. There
remains to explain how P(~ v 2 G(²jXi;!)jXi;µ) and P(:jXi) are computed.
A.1. Computation of P(~ v 2 G(²jXi;!)jXi;µ): For each value of Xi, i = 1;:::;n and » = (!;µ)
on the grid, draw N = 999 values of valence ²l, l = 1;:::;N. For each ²l, check whether ~ v 2
G(²jXi;!) as in Section A.2. Approximate P(~ v 2 G(²jXi;!)jXi;µ) with the Monte Carlo probability
(1=N)
P
l=1;:::;N 1f~ v 2 G(²ljXi;!)g.
A.2. Checking whether ~ v 2 G(²jXi;!): In election e with candidates je and le, voter with position
y and valence perception E will choose candidate je if ¡d(y;yje;!)2+²je > ¡d(y;yle;!)2+²le which
is equivalent to y¢!(yle¡yje) > 1
2(kyjek2
!¡kylek2
!+²le¡²je); where \a¢!b" denotes the inner product






a ¢! a denotes the corresponding norm. Calling ¸e =
yle ¡yje and ¹e = 1
2(kyjek2
!¡kylek2
!+²le ¡²je), the hyperplane He = fy 2 Y j¸t
eWy = ¹eg separates
the ideological space into two regions Y je = fy 2 Y j¸t
eWy > ¹eg and Y le = fy 2 Y j¸t
eWy < ¹eg:
In m elections, a pro¯le v = (j1;:::;jm) corresponds to a voter with ideological position y in theEUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 21
intersection Y j1\:::\Y jm. If this intersection is non empty, the pro¯le is compatible with the voting
model and ~ v 2 G(²jXi;!).
A.3. Construction of P(:jX): To construct P(:jX) we ¯rst compute a nonparametric estimator
^ P(:jX) for P(:jX) (see (Li and Racine 2008) for the procedure and its properties). Heuristically,
we want P · P, i.e. P · ^ P + (P ¡ ^ P) with probability cl. The natural approach is to choose
P equal to P plus the cl-quantile of the distribution of P ¡ ^ P. However ^ P ¡ P is a random
function, hence the quantile of its distribution is not de¯ned. Instead, following (Henry, M¶ eango,





n)), b = 1;:::;B and compute for each the nonparametric estimator
^ Pb(:jX). Let Áb be the minimum over i = 1;:::;n and ~ v(X) 2 f¹ v(X);v(X)g of the quantity
^ P(~ vjXi)¡ ^ Pb(~ vjXi), and let Á¤ be ranked [B£cl]'th in decreasing order among the Áb. Then for all
i = 1;:::;n and ~ v = v(X) or ~ v = v(X), set P(~ vjXi) = ^ P(~ vjXi)+infbf ^ P(~ vjXi)¡ ^ Pb(~ vjXi) j Áb > Á¤g.
See (Henry, M¶ eango, and Queyranne 2010) for discussion of the method and its properties.
Appendix B. Proofs of results in the main text
Proof of lemma 1. As in section A.2, we call ¸e = yle ¡ yje and ¹e = 1
2(kyjek2
! ¡ kylek2
! + ²le ¡ ²je)
and He = fy 2 Y j¸t
eWy = ¹eg the hyperplane that separates the ideological space into two regions
Y je = fy 2 Y j¸t
eWy > ¹eg and Y le = fy 2 Y j¸t
eWy < ¹eg. The k ¯rst hyperplanes de¯ne a
system of k linear equations in k variables ¤yt = ¹ where ¤ = [¸1:::¸k] is a k £ k matrix. The
rank of ¤ is equal to k due to the linear independence of the vectors ¸e, e = 1;:::;m. The equation
of the last hyperplane in this same space is de¯ne by ¸k+1y0 = ¹k+1 Transform the ideological
space with the change of coordinates xt = ¤yt ¡ ¹. The center of the new space is yt
¤ = ¤¡1¹,
which is well de¯ned since ¤ is full rank. We transform also the (k + 1)th hyperplane. It is de¯ned
by H = fx 2 X : ¸k+1¤¡1xt = ¹k+1 ¡ ¸k+1¤¡1¹g. Call v+ (resp. v¡) the orthant de¯ned by22 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
fx 2 X : sign(x) = sign(¸k+1¤¡1)g (resp. fx 2 X : sign(x) = ¡sign(¸k+1¤¡1)g), where the
function sign(x) is understood element by element when applied to a vector. We then have 8x 2 v+,
¸k+1¤¡1xt ¸ 0 and 8x 2 v¡, ¸k+1¤¡1xt · 0. If ¹k+1 ¡¸k+1¤¡1¹ > 0, H cannot partition orthant
v¡, whereas if ¹k+1 ¡ ¸k+1¤¡1¹ < 0 it is v+ which cannot be partitioned. But never both at the
same time. Then, since the number of pro¯les which are not incompatible is ½(k +1;k) = 2k+1 ¡1,
all the orthants except v+ and v¡ are always partitioned, and this for all values of (¹1;:::;¹k+1).
The existence of an incompatible voting pro¯le is due to the fact that one of two pro¯les fv;vg is
not partitioned. Then, the incompatible pro¯le is v if orthant v+ is not partitioned, and v if orthant
v¡ is not partitioned. This is complete our proof. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. Call º the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity ². All pro¯les except
fv(X);v(X)g belong to the equilibrium correspondence G(² j X) for all ². Hence, for any pro¯le
v = 2 fv(X);v(X)g, we have º(G¡1(v j X)) = 1. In addition, º(G¡1(v [ v j X)) = º(G¡1(v j X)) +
º(G¡1(v j X)), since exactly one of the two belongs to G. Suppose (2.2) holds. Take any subset A of
voting pro¯les. If Anfv(X);v(X)g 6= ? or if fv(X);v(X)g µ A, then º(G¡1(A j X)) = 1 ¸ P(AjX).
Otherwise, A = fv(X)g or A = fv(X)g and P(AjX) · º(G¡1(A j X)) by assumption. Hence (EC)
holds, and the proof is complete. ¤
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Table 1. Voting Pro¯les in U.S Presidential, Senate and House elections.
Voting Pro¯les 2000 2004 2008 Aggregate
DDD 246 182 277 705
DDR 36 14 44 94
DRD 21 13 16 50
DRR 22 54 11 87
RDD 21 0 19 40
RDR 20 21 6 47
RRD 31 0 17 48
RRR 205 149 124 478
Total 602 433 514 1549
Table 2. Distribution of ideological square distances.
Democratic candidates
2000 2004 2008 Aggregate
Mean 0.2113 0.1326 0.1029 0.1711
Std dev. 0.2648 0.1719 0.1121 0.2209
Max 2.1579 1.3474 0.6309 2.7159
Republican candidates
2000 2004 2008 Aggregate
Mean 0.1311 0.1656 0.1126 0.1406
Std dev. 0.1544 0.2201 0.1639 0.3275
Max 1.4227 1.6869 0.8461 1.8529
All candidates
2000 2004 2008 Aggregate
Mean 0.4038 0.3649 0.3565 0.3880
Std dev. 0.3368 0.3249 0.2993 0.3275
Max 2.1758 1.9907 1.4703 2.7159EUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 27
Table 3. Distribution of distances between candidates.
Between democrats and republicans
2000 2004 2008 Aggregate
Mean 0.6313 0.6130 0.5981 0.6212
sdt dev. 0.2681 0.2591 0.1981 0.2565
Min 0 0.0056 0.1882 0
Max 2.1758 1.9907 1.4703 2.1758
Between elected candidates
2000 2004 2008 Aggregate
Mean 0.3259 0.3904 0.3333 0.3464
sdt dev. 0.3121 0.3534 0.2431 0.3050
Min 0.0057 0.0014 0.0030 0.0014
Max 1.3824 1.8855 1.1449 1.8855
Table 4. Incidence of violations of spatial voting.
Without heterogeneity (!1 = 1 and !2 = 0)
2000 2004 2008 Aggregate
violations 28 17 5 50
total sample 602 433 514 1549
percentage 4.7% 3.9% 0.7% 3.2%28 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E
Table 5. Minimum valence dispersion to rationalize voting choices.
Rationalization of voting choices
2000 2004 2008 Aggregate
Minimum ´ 0.119 0.089 0.059 0.128
Corresponding ! (0.333,-0.111) (0.222,0.333) (0.333,-0.111) (0.333,-0.111)
Minimum ¾ 0.128 0.069 0.054 0.133
Corresponding ! (0.333,0.111) (0.222,0.333) (0.333,-0.111) (0.333,-0.111)
Reversal of ideological axes.
2000 2004 2008 Aggregate
Minimum ´ 0.178 0.178 0.133 0.222
Minimum ¾ 0.178 0.178 0.133 0.178
Rationalization with a single dimension.
2000 2004 2008 Aggregate
Minimum ´ 0.123 0.133 0.089 0.178

















































Figure 3. Three elections and two ideological dimensions.EUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 31
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4. Ideological positions of candidates in the Poole and Rosen-
thal NOMINATE Common Space. Republicans in red and democrats
in blue. (a) 2000 election, (b) 2004 elections, (c) 2008 elections and (d)
aggregate data.32 MARC HENRY AND ISMAEL MOURIFI¶ E


















































































































Figure 5. Con¯dence region in case of binary speci¯cation of valence
term for aggregate data. (a) Section of the 95% level con¯dence region
for (!;´) at ´ = 0:18; (b) at ´ = 0:22. (c) Con¯dence region for (´;!)
and (d) con¯dence region for (´;Á).EUCLIDEAN REVEALED PREFERENCES 33


















































































































Figure 6. Con¯dence region in case of normal speci¯cation of valence
term for aggregate data. (a) Section of the 95% level con¯dence region
for (!;¾) at ¾ = 0:18; (b) at ¾ = 0:22. (c) Con¯dence region for (¾;!)
and (d) con¯dence region for (¾;Á).